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Abstract
Net neutrality is believed to prevent the emergence of exclusive online content which
yields Internet fragmentation. We examine the relationship between net neutrality regula-
tion and Internet fragmentation in a game-theoretic model that considers the interplay be-
tween termination fees, exclusivity and competition between two Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and between two Content Providers (CPs). An exclusivity arrangement between an
ISP and a CP reduces the CPs exposure to some end users but it also reduces competition
over ads among the CPs. Fragmentation arises in equilibrium when competition over ads
among the CPs is very strong, the CPsrevenues from advertisements are very low, the
content of the CPs is highly complementary, or the termination fees are high. We nd
that the absence of fragmentation is always benecial for consumers, as they can enjoy
all available content. Policy interventions that prevent fragmentation are thus good for
consumers. However, results for total welfare are more mixed. A zero-price rule on tra¢ c
termination is neither a su¢ cient nor a necessary policy instrument to prevent fragmen-
tation. In fact, regulatory interventions may be ine¤ective or even detrimental to welfare
and are only warranted under special circumstances.
Keywords: Net neutrality; Internet fragmentation; Exclusivity.
We thank the senior and associate editor, three anonymous referees, as well as Marc Bourreau, Anna DAnnunzio,
Bruno Jullien, Tobias Klein, and Thibaud Vergé for very constructive and helpful discussions and comments.
yRegulatory Authority for Energy, Pireos 132, 11854, Athens, Greece. Email: kourandi@aueb.gr
zCorresponding author. University of Passau, Chair for Internet and Telecommunications Business, Dr.-Hans-
Kapnger-Str. 12, 94032 Passau, Germany. Phone: +49-851-509-2580, fax: +49-851-509-2582, email: jan.kraemer@uni-
passau.de
xImperial College London, Business School, South Kensington campus, London SW7 2AZ, UK. Email:
t.valletti@imperial.ac.uk
1
JEL Codes: L13; L51; L52; L96.
2
1 Introduction
In the past few years the debate over net neutrality (NN) has attracted large attention by academia and
the public alike. Thereby, the term NN masks several distinct policy issues that are all concerned with
how data ows on the Internet should be handled and priced (Krämer et al., 2013). One of the most
salient issues of NN regulation is that it seeks to maintain the status quo whereby content and service
providers (CPs) pay only once for access to the Internet (usually to some backbone provider), and not
again for the delivery of their tra¢ c to end users at each terminating Internet service provider (ISP).
This custom of ISPs not to charge termination fees has been coined the zero-price rule (Hemphill,
2008; Lee and Wu, 2009). However, although the zero-price rule is still the status quo today, several
ISPs worldwide, among them AT&T (Bloomberg, 2005), Telefonica and Vodafone (Lambert, 2010) as
well as Deutsche Telekom (Deutsche Welle, 2010), have publicly announced that they intend to depart
from this custom. This has heated, if not started, the public debate on NN.
Following Lee and Wu (2009), proponents of NN justify the zero-price rule based on the arguments
that it i) is e¢ cient with respect to the economics of two-sided markets, ii) stimulates innovation and
investment in broadband networks as well as content, and iii) prevents a fragmentation of the Internet.
The rst two of these arguments have been analyzed extensively by the recent academic literature,
resulting in a more di¤erentiated view in this regard (see Schuett, 2010; Faulhaber, 2011; and Krämer
et al., 2013 for a survey). The conclusion from this research is that the zero-price rule is in fact only
e¢ cient under special circumstances (see, e.g., Economides and Tåg, 2012; Guo et al. 2012) and
that the e¤ect of NN regulation on innovation and investment is at best ambiguous (see, e.g., van
Schewick, 2007; Jamison and Hauge, 2008; Choi and Kim, 2010; Cheng et al., 2011; Economides and
Hermalin, 2012; Krämer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Reggiani and Valletti, 2012; Bourreau et al., 2014; Guo
and Easley, 2014). Interestingly, the third argument, that the zero-price rule prevents a fragmentation
of the Internet, has thus far not been considered in detail. This aspect of the NN debate is important,
however, as has recently been highlighted by Neelie Kroes, vice president of the European Commission,
who emphasized that Internet fragmentation should be a concern to all Internet stakeholders: I know
there are pressures regulatory, political and economic to fragment the Internet [...]. But the
Internets most important characteristic is its universality: in principle, every node can communicate
with every other. This has important implications for innovation, plurality, democratic values, cohesion
and economic growth(Worth, 2011). Moreover, a comprehensive analysis of the e¤ect of a zero-price
rule with respect to all three of the above mentioned arguments seems necessary in the light of current
regulatory developments: several governments throughout the world (e.g., Canada, Japan, France,
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Germany, UK (Carter et. al, 2010; Sluijs, 2012)) are considering whether to adopt a zero-price rule.
The USA, Netherlands, Chile and Slovenia already enacted such NN regulation, which in the case of
the USA, has been challenged in courts.
The link between Internet fragmentation and NN regulation (i.e., a zero-price rule) may not be
obvious immediately. It can be traced back to an inuential article by Lee and Wu (2009), who
conjectured that the presence of termination fees would almost certainly result in service providers
competingfor content, as seen in other platform industries, by charging di¤erent fees and bargaining
on exclusive arrangements with content providers. In turn, such bilateral agreements would inevitably
lead to fragmentation where certain content would only be available on certain service providers and
hence multiple Internets(p.67). Certainly, this is a daunting hypothesis, which, if it were true, could
be able to tilt the debate in favor of NN regulation. However, this conjecture was never investigated
formally and there are at least two reasons to scrutinize it. First, the authors build their argument
on a comparison of the Internet to other platform industries, such as video consoles and credit cards.
Thereby they neglect that, albeit the Internet can be seen as a platform industry that connects end
users with CPs, it is also very di¤erent from the aforementioned industries with respect to how content
is nanced. On the Internet content is still predominantly nanced through advertisements (Dou, 2004;
Evans, 2009; Anderson, 2012) and these advertisement revenues are collected directly by the CPs. This
makes the Internet distinct from other platform industries in which content is either paid directly by
end users (as, e.g., in the context of video games and credit cards) and not by advertisements, or in
which advertisement revenues are collected by the vertically integrated platform providers (e.g., by
TV stations and newspapers) and not by independent CPs.
Second, the proposed link between the presence of termination fees and the existence of exclusive
content does not seem to be inevitable. For example, in the mid 90s, when the zero-price rule was still
undisputed, many ISPs, including AOL, Prodigy and Compuserve, each adopted a so-called walled
garden strategy, which relied on exclusive content to attract customers. More recently, especially
mobile ISPs seem to compete for customers through exclusive content that is delivered through carrier-
specic apps. To be precise, in this context exclusiveusually refers only to exclusive mobile access
(e.g., via a smartphone) to the content, but does not mean that the content is generally not available
through other channels (e.g., xed networks). Nevertheless, the exclusive content deals are clearly
aimed to di¤erentiate the (mobile) ISPsnetworks, and they occur in the absence of a termination fee
for CPs. For example, Verizon and the NFL recently struck an exclusive content deal where certain
games can be streamed only on smartphones of Verizon subscribers (CNNMoney, 2013). In order to
attain this exclusive content, Verizon pays an exclusivity fee of $1 billion over the course of four years.
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Similarly, in the past Verizon customers received exclusive mobile access to content of Microsoft (Los
Angeles Times, 2010) and ESPN (Verizon, 2007). Other mobile ISPs have made similar exclusivity
arrangements. These include AT&T with Electronic Arts (AT&T, 2008) and Zynga (Bloomberg,
2011), Vodafone and Eidos (PRNewswire, 2003) as well as Deutsche Telekom and Bild, Germanys
largest tabloid newspaper (Nehl and Parplies, 2002). Hence, although the extent of exclusive content
on the Internet is still rather limited (which is in line with the intuition that the current status quo
of zero termination fees inhibits Internet fragmentation) it is not obvious that a zero-price rule can
prevent Internet fragmentation.
Thus, it is interesting to study the precise interaction between the zero-price rule and Internet
fragmentation. In this paper we propose a game-theoretic model to formally address this issue. The
model takes into account the specics of the Internet industry and considers the interplay between ter-
mination fees (i.e., a departure of the zero-price rule where fees are paid by the CPs to the terminating
ISPs), exclusivity arrangements, and competition between ISPs and CPs, respectively. In this context,
we also consider various externalities (such as complementarity and substitutability of content) that
were previously not considered in the literature on NN. In this vein, we can o¤er a more ne grained
view on whether and when termination fees in fact raise the danger of Internet fragmentation, and
what their impacts are on the ISPsand CPsprots as well as on welfare. Moreover, we consider
the impact of a no-exclusivity rule, which forbids ISPs and CPs to strike a deal on the exclusivity of
content, as an alternative to the zero-price rule. The no-exclusivity rule, which is easy to implement
and enforce by policy-makers, may address the problem of Internet fragmentation more directly. A
similar rule has been proposed to the TV broadcasting market in the UK, for example. However, this
was justied on the grounds of antitrust concerns and not by the fear of fragmentation (Weeds, 2013).
In particular, we consider competition between two access ISPs which connect Internet users to
CPs. Internet users prefer the ISP that o¤ers more (or more valuable) content. In reverse, CPs make
money through online advertisements and therefore prefer to be seen by many users. Hence, there are
cross-side network e¤ects which characterize a two-sided market (Armstrong, 2006; Rochet and Tirole,
2006). If exclusivity arrangements are allowed, each ISP can bargain with a CP for the terms under
which it is visible exclusively to the ISPs customers. Generally, the CP must trade-o¤ two e¤ects
when considering whether to accept such an exclusivity arrangement. On the one hand, exclusivity
may result in a loss of exposure, thereby diminishing the CPs ad revenues. On the other hand, CPs
are in competition for Internet usersclicksand thus, by means of exclusivity agreements, CPs may
benet from reduced competition. In addition, the ISP may choose to compensate the CP for agreeing
to be exclusive to the ISP. This is especially true for highly valued content, which will in turn raise
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the relative attractiveness of the ISP and induce customers to sign a contract with it.
Our results highlight that Internet fragmentation (i.e., exclusivity of content) can occur also in the
presence of a zero-price rule. This holds true, even if ISPs are not allowed to nancially compensate
the CP for a loss in exposure (i.e., when the exclusivity fees are also restricted to be zero). In a
nutshell, a zero-price rule, as suggested by Lee and Wu (2009), is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient
condition to prevent Internet fragmentation. Hence, our nding is in line with the empirical evidence
described above. However, everything else equal, we also conrm that Internet fragmentation does
become more likely with the introduction of termination fees. The reason is simply that termination
fees accrue at each ISP where the CP is visible and thus they a¤ect the CPs outside option in favor
of accepting exclusivity. However, the conditions under which fragmentation occurs are more subtle
and sometimes counterintuitive; and even in the presence of termination fees, fragmentation is not the
inevitable outcome.
First, we note that there are various degrees to fragmentation that must be di¤erentiated. Frag-
mentation, if it occurs, can either be partial, i.e., only a subset of the CPs is available exclusively at
some ISP, or full, i.e., each CP is available at exactly one ISP only. Full fragmentation is the likely
outcome when either i) competition over ads among the CPs is very strong, or ii) when the CPsrev-
enue from advertisements are very low (i.e., there are only weak network e¤ects for consumers on the
CP side), or iii) when the online content of the CPs is highly complementary, or iv) when the termi-
nation fees are high. When CPs compete ercely for customersclicks (case i), then full fragmentation
becomes more likely, because it o¤ers the CP a means to collectively evade this competitive pressure,
although, unilaterally, exclusivity can harm a CP. Likewise, if the CPsability to make money through
advertisements is limited (case ii), they prefer to strike an exclusivity deal. If, however, Internet users
consider the CPscontent as highly complementary on the consumer side, then it is more likely that
there is a Nash equilibrium wherein each ISP seeks to have an exclusive deal with a CP: if a rival
ISP has agreed exclusivity with a CP, then the other ISP will want to do the same with the remain-
ing CP, as, otherwise, the complementarity would benet only the rival (case iii). Finally, when the
termination fees paid to each ISP are high enough, it becomes more expensive for the CPs to deliver
their content to both ISPs (case iv). On the contrary, if some of the above conditions are not met,
either partial or no fragmentation is the likely outcome. In particular, fragmentation does not occur
if competition over ads among the CPs is weak and CPsrevenues from ads are high.
Concerning welfare, we nd that consumer surplus is always highest under no fragmentation. Since
the joint value of both contents is at least as high as the value of each content solely, this result arises
as competition between ISPs does not allow them to raise the subscription fees too much to reect
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the increase in content. However, with respect to total welfare, which also incorporates the ISPsand
CPsrevenues, no fragmentation is the e¢ cient outcome only when ad competition among the CPs is
rather weak. If ad competition between CPs is strong, then exclusivity provides a means to avoid this
competitive pressure and to increase CPsprots, which can render full fragmentation the e¢ cient
outcome with respect to total welfare. Thus, if policy makers want to ensure no fragmentation (e.g.,
because they value consumer surplus more, or because they believe that competition over ads among
the CPs is rather weak), then a simple no-exclusivity rule is a well-suited instrument. By contrast,
as noted above, a zero-price rule cannot prevent Internet fragmentation. In all other cases, (NN)
regulation is at best superuous, because it cannot improve on the equilibrium outcome without NN
regulation. In fact, such regulation can be harmful, in the sense that the equilibrium is shifted away
from the rst-best. Thus, after all, NN regulation in the form of a zero-price rule does not seem to be
the appropriate policy instrument to prevent Internet fragmentation.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we relate our framework and
ndings to the extant literature. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 derives the equilibrium with
termination and exclusivity fees and discusses the properties of the equilibrium outcome. Section 5
examines di¤erent approaches with respect to NN regulation, and policy implications are discussed in
Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we present and discuss extensions and limitations of our base model
before we conclude in Section 8.
2 Related literature
The present paper relates both to the literature on NN, as well as to the literature on exclusive
dealing. The economic research on NN is reviewed by Schuett (2010), Faulhaber (2011), and Krämer
et al. (2013). These reviews highlight that deviations from NN can either occur with respect to
the zero-price rule (e.g., demanding a termination fee from each CP that is accessible through the
ISPs network), or with respect to the so-called no-discrimination rule (e.g., blocking of content or
degrading tra¢ c ows by non-integrated CPs), or both (e.g., pay-for-priority arrangements between
ISP and CP). In this paper, we only consider NN as a zero-price rule for two reasons: rst, the aim
of this paper is to analyze the relationship between termination fees (i.e., the zero-price rule) and
Internet fragmentation. To focus on this issue we deliberately abstract from additional issues that
may arise due to network congestion management (e.g., Guo et al., 2013) or due to competition of
vertically-integrated ISPs with independent CPs (e.g., Guo et al., 2010). In this context, also note
that exclusive content, that we consider here, is not comparable to network management practices
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such as blocking content, because blocking is the result of unilateral action by the ISP and not, as
here, the outcome of a bilateral, voluntary agreement between the ISP and CP. Second, our focus
on the zero-price rule is in line with the majority of the economic papers on NN (e.g., Jamison and
Hauge, 2008; Choi and Kim, 2010; Cheng et al., 2011; Economides and Hermalin, 2012; Economides
and Tåg, 2012; Guo et al., 2012; Krämer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Reggiani and Valletti, 2012; Bourreau
et al., 2014; Choi et al., 2014; Guo and Easley, 2014). These papers have addressed important policy
questions, ranging from the e¤ect of a zero-price rule on CPssurplus (e.g., Jamison and Hauge, 2008;
Economides and Tåg, 2012), on broadband investment (e.g., Choi and Kim, 2010; Cheng et al., 2011;
Krämer and Wiewiorra, 2012), on content innovation (e.g., Hermalin and Katz, 2007; Guo et al., 2012),
end user surplus and coverage of the consumer market (e.g., Krämer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Guo and
Easley, 2013), as well as on competition between ISPs (e.g., Economides and Tåg, 2012; Reggiani and
Valletti, 2012; Njoroge et al., 2013; Bourreau et al., 2014; Choi et al., 2014). In summary, the previous
economic literature suggests that a deviation from the zero-price rule may generally benet welfare
(i.e., consumer surplus or total surplus), although most papers also identify particular scenarios under
which NN is welfare superior (see Krämer et al., 2013, for a review). In particular, by the logic of
a two-sided market, consumer surplus has a tendency to be higher when deviating from NN because
the ISP is likely to lower end users subscription fees when charging termination fees from CPs. Also
total surplus tends to be higher without NN, because the ISP can use its increased pricing exibility
to incentivize more e¢ cient utilization of the network. However, none of these papers considers the
e¤ect of the zero-price rule on Internet fragmentation, and, as we will show, the zero-price rule has
a di¤erent e¤ect on welfare here. On the one hand, as consumers prefer a non-fragmented Internet
and the zero-price rule hinders Internet fragmentation, it generally benets consumer surplus. On
the other hand, the zero-price rule restricts the contractual exibility of ISPs and CPs, which can
negatively a¤ect total surplus, especially in the presence of strong competition among CPs. Overall
we thus nd mixed evidence on the e¤ect of the zero-price rule on welfare. At the same time, we can
show that NN regulation is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient policy instrument to improve welfare
in the context of Internet fragmentation.
Our paper also relates to the literature on exclusive dealing, which, however, is primarily concerned
with the conditions under which exclusive content emerges in the broadcasting and media industry
(e.g., Armstrong, 1999; Dukes and Gal-Or, 2003; Peitz and Valletti, 2008; DAnnunzio and Russo,
2013; Weeds, 2013). The paper from this stream of the literature that is most similar to ours is Hagiu
and Lee (2011). The authors also consider competition between platforms that can beforehand o¤er
exclusivity contracts to CPs. However, their model set up di¤ers in some key aspects to ours, as
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the authors clearly have other platform industries in mind (such as the video games industry), where
consumers pay for content directly. The main di¤erences are thus, that Hagiu and Lee 1) do not
consider ad-nanced CPs, who cannot control the pricing of their content directly, 2) do not consider
termination fees, and 3) do not consider that CPs are in competition with each other (for ads, in our
model). These di¤erences in assumptions also drive important di¤erences in the results. For example,
Hagiu and Lee nd that either no or full fragmentation occurs in equilibrium. In their setting, unlike
ours, partial fragmentation is not an equilibrium outcome. Moreover, because the focus of the paper
is di¤erent, Hagiu and Lee study the conditions under which fragmentation occurs and do not address
the policy questions that we are concerned with here. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, our paper
is the rst that formally considers the relationship between termination fees and exclusive contracting
in the context of the NN debate.
3 A model of competing ISPs and CPs
We consider a scenario in which end users have the choice between two ISPs through which they can
access content and services on the Internet. For expositional clarity, we assume that there exist exactly
two CPs on the Internet to which all end users wish to have access. Of course, while the Internet is
made up of a magnitude of CPs in reality, a subset of which creates some positive utility, this simplied
structure of two CPs allows us best to study the role of NN regulation on the competition between
CPs and ISPs. In order to obtain more general results, we make no particular assumption on the
nature of the content, and allow for every feasible economic relationship between the two contents,
i.e., they may be perceived as complementary, substitutable or independent by the end users. We
assume that CPs provide content free of charge to the end users via the broadband networks of the
ISPs and derive revenues from advertising on their websites. This is the prevalent business model
on the Internet (Dou, 2004; Evans, 2009; Anderson, 2012) and has therefore also been the dominant
modeling assumption in previous literature (e.g., Choi and Kim, 2010; Cheng et al., 2011; Guo et al.,
2012; Krämer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Reggiani and Valletti, 2012; Bourreau et al., 2014).
Absent NN regulation, i.e., no zero-price-rule is in e¤ect, an ISP may charge a positive termination
fee for sending the CPscontent to its customers. Moreover, each CP and ISP may strike an exclusivity
deal under which the CPs content is available exclusively at the ISP. Internet fragmentation is said to
occur whenever some content is not delivered by all ISPs and, consequently, not to all end users. Partial
fragmentation occurs if only one of the two CPs strikes an exclusivity deal, whereas full fragmentation
is said to occur when each CP is mutually exclusive at one ISP. The details of the model follow.
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End users There is a unit mass of heterogeneous end users that have a natural preference for one of
the two ISPs. Userspreference for the ISPs is denoted by z, and assumed to be uniformly distributed
between zero and one (Hotelling, 1929). The two ISPs (denoted by i 2 fA; Bg) are horizontally
di¤erentiated and located at either end of the userspreference spectrum, i.e., ISP A at z = 0 and ISP
B at z = 1 (see, e.g., Economides and Tåg, 2012; Bourreau et al., 2014; Choi et al., 2014 for a similar
set up). Thus, a type z consumer derives utility of Uz = b+ uA   pA   tz; when he subscribes to ISP
A, whereas he obtains utility of Uz = b+uB pB  t (1  z) ; when he subscribes to ISP B. Thereby, b
denotes the base utility from being connected to the Internet, ui denotes the utility of the content that
is available at ISP i and pi is the subscription fee. Moreover, t measures the degree of competition
between the two ISPs. When t is large, the userspreference for the ISPs becomes more important,
such that competition on the basis of ui and pi becomes weaker. End users will choose the ISP that
gives them the highest utility. We denote the end user demand for ISP i by Di.1 Furthermore, we
assume that b is large enough, such that the market is fully covered, i.e., DA +DB = 1:
Content providers There are two competing and di¤erentiated CPs (denoted by j 2 f1; 2g) that
derive revenues from advertising and may have to pay xed termination fees to the ISPs via which
they deliver their content to the end users. Without loss of generality, let CP 1 o¤er content that is
valued weakly more by the end users (u1  u2) when consumed on its own. Although the content
of CP 1 is weakly more valuable to consumers, this does not imply that CP 1 faces higher marginal
costs than CP 2. CPs provide information goods, which are characterized by large xed costs and zero
marginal costs. When both contents are available to the end user, the utility of the joint consumption
of both CPscontent is denoted as u12. It is reasonable to assume that there exists no disutility from
the availability of more content, i.e., u12  u1. Therefore, both contents jointly do not reduce the
value of any one content alone. Notice that u12 denotes the level of complementarity/substitutability
of the CPs content. As u12 increases, everything else being equal, the contents of CP 1 and CP 2
become more complementary. Also note that uA; uB 2 fu12; u1; u2g depending on the content that
each ISP o¤ers.
Following the current concerns of the policy debate outlined in the introduction, we introduce two
types of lump-sum fees that might be exchanged between the ISPs and CPs. First, the termination
fee f , paid by a CP to the ISP for delivering its content to the end users. This fee f is constant, the
same across the ISPs and the CPs, and is exogenously set, for example, by a regulator. Consequently,
1For expositional clarity, we suppress the arguments of the demand function Di(uA; uB ; pA; pB) and write Di in the
following.
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f = 0 corresponds to the zero-price rule. Second, we also study an exclusivity fee eij which is paid by
CP j when it delivers its content exclusively to ISP i. As will be described later, eij is endogenously
determined via a negotiation between the ISPs and the CPs. It may thus be positive or negative. This
means that the ISP may either pay the CP to be exclusive to its network, or be paid in order to grant
the CP exclusivity. Each CP may choose to be available at a single ISP (and pay the termination fee
plus the exclusivity fee) or at both ISPs (and pay only the termination fee, but at each ISP); that is,
we allow the CPs to single-home or to multi-home. In particular, this means that when CPs do not
have to pay termination fees (f = 0), which is the current status quo, then the content of both CPs
will generally be available at both ISPs, unless a CP deliberately chooses to make its content available
exclusively. If a CP agrees to be exclusive with ISP i, then it can only be accessed by the end users
connected to that ISP.2
CPs receive advertising revenues depending on the exposure to end users and depending on the
level of competition over ads among the two CPs.3 Thus, a CP that is available at both ISPs receives
an exposure of DA +DB = 1. Similarly, a CP that is only available at one ISP, say i, will inevitably
have a reduced exposure of Di < 1.
When the CP competes for customers clicks with the other CP, the CPs receive a standard
advertisement rate of r. However, if a CP is the only CP available to the end users at some ISP, it is
assumed that this CP can demand a higher advertising rate (ar, with a > 1). In other words, we are
particularly interested in how the level of ad competition between CPs a¤ects Internet fragmentation:
when only one CP is available at an ISP, it is natural to assume that the CP will be able to command
higher revenues from advertising compared to the situation where the CP has to share the end users
attention with another CP at the same ISP. There are several ways to motivate this assumption. For
example, think of end users that consume Internet services for a limited period of time: therefore, when
there are multiple contents o¤ered by the platform they connect to, they may not visit all available
content. This implies that, in the presence of more CPs at any given ISP i, each CP e¤ectively
receives less than Di visits, whereas it would have received Di visits if it were the only CP at ISP
i: Consequently, the advertisement rate it can demand from advertisers is lower. Similarly, CPs may
2Exclusivity here is one-way, meaning that if ISP i has an exclusivity deal with CP j, CP j delivers its content only
to ISP i, but ISP i may serve CP  j too.
3 In reality, CPs receive ad revenues either for each click on a given ad ("competition for clicks") or for each page
impression on which a given ad is shown ("competition for eyeballs"). Usually, CPs o¤er both advertising models
concurrently (such as Google or Facebook). Knowing that a certain percentage of the page visitors also clicks on an ad
(this factor is known as the click-through-rate), both models likewise depend crucially on how many visitors a CP can
potentially attract to its website. This is what we denote by exposure. For the purpose of our analysis it is therefore
not relevant whether a CP o¤ers an advertisement model that is based on per-click or per-impression, or both.
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be literally substitutable, meaning that end users visit one specic content (e.g., one search engine)
and not all available content, something that a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of advertising and the revenues
associated to it (see Athey et al., 2012). But also if CPs are complementary and users are not time
constrained, such that all end users connected to a given ISP will visit all available CPs, there is likely
a di¤erentiation in advertisement rates. For example, assume that the advertisersmarginal valuation
for an ad impression decreases with the number of impressions as in DAnnunzio and Russo (2013).
Say the rst impression is worth r1, whereas subsequent impressions of the same ad are only worth r
with r1 = ar > r. Consequently, if a CP is the only outlet for ads at a given ISP, it can demand an
advertisement rate of r1. By contrast, if there are two CPs associated with an ISP, then advertisers
have the choice to buy ad space from both CPs or only from one of the CPs. As each CP will be
visited equally often by the same end users, the advertiser will buy ad space from only one CP (say
randomly) if CPs ask for more than r: This will drive the advertisement rate down to r, as any higher
advertisement rate could be protably undercut by the rival CP.
Although we fall short of providing a fully-specied game of competition between CPs, our reduced-
form approach is an advancement with respect to the extant literature and allows us to study various
types of competition scenarios, as exemplied above. A CP can be sure that end users on a platform
will watch only its own content when this content is the only content delivered in that platform and
thus the advertising rate will be r1 = ar. If instead a CP has to share the end usersattention with
another CP on the same platform, the advertising rate will be reduced. The parameter a reects this
type of competitive pressure: the higher is a, the stronger is the competition for clicks.4 Moreover,
notice that a can possibly take on any value between one and innity. To see this, notice that a = r1=r
goes to innity when the value of the second impression of an ad goes to zero in the example above.
In summary, depending on the exclusivity of content, the prot of CP j is given by
CPj=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
r   2f if both CPs non-exclusive
arDi + rD i   2f if CP j non-exclusive & CP  j exclusive at ISP  i
rDi   f   eij if CP j exclusive at ISP i & CP  j non-exclusive
arDi   f   eij if CP j exclusive at ISP i & CP  j exclusive at ISP  i.
Thereby,  i and  j denote the index of the other ISP and CP, respectively. Moreover, note that
the exposure Di di¤ers among the four cases.
4Thus, competition between CPs is modeled only indirectly via the parameter a. It is di¤erent from competition
between ISPs, who instead compete in a more standard way by setting prices to attract subscribers.
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Internet service providers The prot function of ISP i is
ISPi=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
piDi + 2f if both CPs non-exclusive
piDi + f if CP j non-exclusive & CP  j exclusive at ISP  i
piDi + 2f + eij if CP j exclusive at ISP i & CP  j non-exclusive
piDi + f + eij if CP j exclusive at ISP i & CP  j exclusive at ISP  i.
(1)
Notice that the cases correspond to no, partial and full Internet fragmentation, respectively.
Structure and timing We consider the following three-stage game:
1. The ISPs make simultaneously a take-it-or-leave-it exclusivity o¤er to CP 1, ei1: CP 1 accepts
one of the two o¤ers, or rejects both in which case it delivers its content to both ISPs.5
2. (a) If there was no exclusivity reached in the rst stage, the ISPs make simultaneously a take-
it-or-leave-it exclusivity o¤er to CP 2, ei2, and CP 2 either accepts one of the two o¤ers or
rejects both and delivers its content to both ISPs.
(b) Otherwise, if ISP  i has agreed with CP 1 on an exclusivity contract, it cannot o¤er an
exclusivity contract to CP 2 as well. Thus, only ISP i can make an exclusivity o¤er to CP
2: CP 2 either accepts this o¤er, or rejects it and delivers its content to both ISPs.6
3. The ISPs simultaneously announce the subscription fees pA, pB and the end users, who are aware
about which CP is available at each ISP, choose which ISP to subscribe to.
Under NN regulation, the game is modied in one of the following three ways. First, NN regu-
lation can impose a zero-price rule, which restricts the termination fee to zero. This is the standard
notion of NN regulation that is currently discussed in the policy debate. Second, regulators may also
wish to adopt a stricter form of the zero-price rule which restricts all fees that might be exchanged
between ISPs and CPs to zero (i.e., the termination fees and the exclusivity fees). Third, and alterna-
tively, NN regulation could impose a straightforward no-exclusivity rule which forbids any exclusivity
arrangements between ISPs and CPs. These cases are presented in Section 5.
The base model outlined above establishes the minimal set of interactions necessary to drive our
results. Evidently, the actual interaction between ISPs and CPs may be more complex. In the appendix
5Without reaching an exclusivity arrangement, a CP delivers its content to both ISPs. This corresponds to the status
quo where the content is available to all ISPs.
6We do not study the extreme case where a single ISP o¤ers both contents and the rival ISP exits the market; this
scenario would almost certainly be blocked by the antitrust authorities.
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we therefore study several variants and extensions of the above three-stage game, which show that our
main insights derived from this game are robust. In Appendix D we allow ISPs to make exclusivity
o¤ers to both CPs simultaneously. In Appendix F we study an extended game where CPs determine
the quality of their content endogenously at an initial stage. Similarly, in Appendix G we consider
a game where ISPs determine the termination fee endogenously. Finally, in Appendix H we modify
the last stage of the game in that we allow consumers to subscribe to both ISPs (multi-homing). We
discuss these extensions in more detail in Section 7.
4 Without NN regulation
Without NN regulation, exclusivity contracts and positive termination fees are both feasible. Recall
that the ISPs make exclusivity o¤ers rst to the more e¢ cient CP, i.e., CP 1, that generates more
value in the network and then to the less e¢ cient CP 2. The two ISPs, however, are symmetric such
that it is in most cases not necessary to distinguish between them. Thus, there are four potential
subgames that should be considered (see Figure 1). These can be denoted by a tuple (x; y), where
x; y 2 fE;NEg means that CP 1 (x) and CP 2 (y) are exclusive (E) or not exclusive (NE) with
any of the two ISPs, respectively. When both CPs sign an exclusivity contract, full fragmentation
emerges, (E, E),7 while when a single CP signs an exclusivity contract, partial fragmentation emerges,
either (E, NE) or (NE, E).8 Finally, when both CPs deliver their content to both ISPs, there is no
fragmentation, i.e., (NE, NE).
We proceed backwards to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
Stage 3: Subscription fees and end usersdecisions At the third stage, each consumer chooses
whether to subscribe to ISP A or ISP B. The consumer that is indi¤erent between the two ISPs,
denoted by ez, is derived by equating b+ uA   pA   tez = b+ uB   pB   t (1  ez), which yields
ez(uA; uB; pA; pB) = 1
2
+
uA   uB
2t
+
pB   pA
2t
: (2)
7The case where CP 1 delivers its content exclusively to ISP A and CP 2 delivers its content exclusively to ISP B is
symmetric to the case where CP 1 delivers its content exclusively to ISP B and CP 2 delivers its content exclusively to
ISP A.
8The case where CP j delivers its content exclusively to ISP A and CP  j delivers its content to both ISPs is
symmetric to the case where CP j delivers its content exclusively to ISP B and CP  j delivers its content to both ISPs.
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The end usersdemands for ISP A and ISP B are thus DA = ez and DB = 1   ez, respectively. The
two ISPs compete by setting a subscription fee to the end users. ISP i maximizes (1) with respect to
pi. Since f and eij are xed fees, the rst-order conditions give the equilibrium subscription fees
pA = t+
uA   uB
3
; pB = t+
uB   uA
3
: (3)
Replacing for pA and pB into (2), we obtain for the equilibrium demand of the ISPs
DA = 1 DB = 1
2
+
uA   uB
6t
; (4)
which is exactly 1/2 in case the same content is available at both ISPs. Otherwise the ISP with the
more valuable content receives a higher market share than the rival.
In order to focus on the interesting case where each ISP receives positive demand, we need that
 3t < ui   u i < 3t. A su¢ cient condition that satises this, and that we assume throughout the
paper, is
t > (u12   u2)=3: (5)
Stage 2: Exclusivity o¤ered to CP 2 In this stage, there are two di¤erent types of subgames,
depending on whether CP 1 has accepted exclusivity (cases (E; )) or not (cases (NE; )).
While we relegate all the details to Appendix A, we now sketch how the game develops. Consider
rst the case where, in stage 1, CP 1 has agreed on exclusivity with ISP  i. In this case, at stage
2, it is ISP i that can respond by o¤ering exclusivity to CP 2 (this corresponds to the left branch of
Figure 1). Since exclusivity fees are lump sums, exclusivity will arise if and only if the joint prots
of CP 2 and ISP i are higher under exclusivity than without it. There are two conicting e¤ects at
play here. On the one hand, when exclusivity is chosen, ISP i gets a larger market share and can
compensate CP 2 for agreeing to exclusivity. On the other hand, the CP that delivers its content to
a single ISP exclusively, inevitably loses some exposure. The value to CP 2 from exposure, however,
depends on the intensity of competition over ads between the CPs. We nd that, when ad competition
is high (i.e., a > ba), the rst e¤ect dominates the second e¤ect and, thus, full fragmentation arises in
equilibrium. Exclusivity prevails as CPscompetition is intense and thus the benet from exposure is
low, which also means that CP 2 may end up paying a rather substantial exclusivity fee.
Fragmentation can also arise for weak competition over ads among the CPs (a  ba), as long as the
advertisement rate is generally low (r<br). The reason for exclusivity is now di¤erent, however. Take
for example, the extreme case where r approaches zero. It is then cheap for ISP i to attract exclusively
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CP 2, since the latter has not much advertising revenues to lose anyway, while the ISP can increase
its own market share. Instead, when competition over ads among the CPs is weak (a  ba) and the
advertisement rate is high (rbr), it would be very costly to convince CP 2 to agree on exclusivity.
Therefore, in this parameter range, ISP i does not o¤er exclusivity to CP 2.
The remaining cases are those in which no exclusivity has been reached at stage 1 between CP 1
and any ISP (right branch of Figure 1). Now, there is competition between the two ISPs for CP 2;
either one ISP achieves an exclusive arrangement with CP 2, or the content of CP 2 is delivered to
both platforms. This bidding game obviously goes to the advantage of CP 2, and stops when each
ISP is just indi¤erent between winning and losing to the rival the content delivered by CP 2. In
particular, exclusivity arises as long as r < r. Again, in the presence of a high advertisement rate
(r  r), exclusivity is not o¤ered to CP 2 by any of the two ISPs, because it would be too costly to
compensate CP 2 for its loss in exposure.
Stage 1: Exclusivity o¤ered to CP 1 At the rst stage of the game, the reasoning is similar, with
the additional feature that CP 1 and the ISPs anticipate the decisions in the second stage. Exclusivity
with CP 1 will arise if and only if the joint prots of CP 1 and ISP i are higher under exclusivity
than without it. CP 1 will be o¤ered an exclusivity contract which it accepts either when the ad
competition between CPs is very strong (a  ba) or when ad competition between CPs is weak (a < ba)
and the advertisement rate is rather low. Whereas for a  ba, full fragmentation is the inevitable
equilibrium outcome (i.e., (E;E)), for a < ba either full ((E;E)), partial ((E;NE), or (NE;E)) or
no fragmentation ((NE;NE)) may arise in equilibrium, depending on the level of r. The equilibrium
outcome is summarized by the following proposition. The details of the proof are in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Full Internet fragmentation emerges in equilibrium either when ad competition between
CPs is relatively high (a  ba), or when ad competition between CPs is relatively low (a < ba) and the
advertisement rate on the Internet is low (r < br(a)). When ad competition between CPs is relatively
low (a < ba) and the advertisement rate takes intermediate values (br(a) < r < er), partial Internet
fragmentation occurs. On the contrary, no Internet fragmentation occurs when ad competition between
CPs is relatively low (a < ba) and the advertisement rate is high (r  max fer;br(a)g).
The relevant thresholds are as follows:
ba = (u12   u2 + 3t) = (u12   u1) (6)
br (a) =  f + u12   u1
3
+
(u1   u2)2
18t
  (u12   u2)
2
18t
!
=

3t+ u12   u2   a (u12   u1)
6t

(7)
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er =  (3t+ u12   u2)2
18t
  t
2
+f
!
=

3t  (u12   u2)
6t

: (8)
Before providing the intuition for this result, we rst present a numerical example to illustrate
the equilibrium outcome. Figure 2 shows the thresholds for the various fragmentation cases and the
resulting equilibrium regions in the (a; r) space.9 When a is high enough full fragmentation always
occurs. Full fragmentation also emerges for low values of a and r: in the area to the left of the dashed
vertical line, both exclusivity fees become negative, i.e., ISPs pay the CPs to obtain exclusivity. The
exclusivity fee paid by the less e¢ cient CP becomes positive faster with the increase in a than the
exclusivity fee paid by the more e¢ cient CP.
For relative low values of a and intermediate values of r, partial fragmentation is the equilibrium
outcome. Finally, when r is high enough but a is not too high, CPs deliver their content to both ISPs
and serve all end users.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
We now provide further intuition for the three types of equilibria that emerge from Proposition 1.
Full fragmentation. In our three-stage game, full Internet fragmentation emerges in equilibrium
either when a is relatively high, or when both a and r are relatively low. For relatively high a,
competition for ads between the CPs is strong enough; thus, a way to relax this competition is to
collectively opt for exclusivity at each platform. Note, however, that a CP cannot unilaterally evade
competition by choosing exclusivity: say CP 1 and ISP A strike an exclusive deal, but CP 2 multi-
homes. Then CP 2 (and not CP 1) is going to benet from reduced competition, because it is the only
CP available at ISP B, whereas CP 1 continues to face competition by CP 2 at ISP A. Hence, the CPs
can only evade competition if they both strike an exclusive deal with a di¤erent ISP, i.e., under full
fragmentation. Also note that competition between CPs can be so intense and thus the CPsbenets
under full fragmentation so large, that for relatively high values of a and r, both exclusivity fees are
positive (i.e., CPs should pay these fees to the ISPs). But as a and r become smaller, competition
between ISPs becomes the driver for full Internet fragmentation. Advertising revenues are not too
important, and each ISP is ghting with its rival for an exclusivity contract, in order to boost the
demand they obtain and, therefore, their revenues via the subscription fees. The exclusivity fee paid
by the more e¢ cient CP 1 is lower than the exclusivity fee paid by CP 2 (ei1 < ei2), since CP 1 can
leverage its content which is more valuable to the end users. In this context, it is important to mention
9 In the gure, it is assumed that the two contents are purely additive (u12 = u1 + u2). As will be seen later, the
results are qualitatively unchanged if content is complementary or substitutable or if u12 and a are correlated.
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that the absolute size of the exclusivity fee generally depends on the relative bargaining power between
ISPs and CPs which we do not study in detail. However, also note that whether exclusivity emerges
in equilibrium depends only on the comparison of the joint prots of the ISP and CP in each scenario.
Hence, the fragmentation equilibrium is independent of the relative bargaining power, i.e., how the
additional surplus from exclusivity is divided among the ISP and CP.
Partial fragmentation. For intermediate values of the advertising rate r and a <ba, partial frag-
mentation is obtained in equilibrium. Depending on the parameter values, both types of partial
fragmentation may emerge in equilibrium, i.e., with exclusivity obtained by the more e¢ cient CP
1, (E, NE) or with the less e¢ cient CP 2, (NE, E). In both cases the CP that delivers its content
exclusively to a single ISP obtains a slotting fee, while the rival CP delivers its content to both ISPs.
The reason for this richness of partial fragmentation equilibria stems from the possible di¤erent best
replies by CP 2 in the continuation game. When r is high enough,10 it is a dominant strategy for
CP 2 always not to be exclusive in the continuation game. Hence, in the rst stage, CP 1 goes for
exclusivity with ISP i only when it can be compensated enough for the loss of exposure at the other
ISP  i. This indeed happens as long as r < er, yielding (E, NE). When instead r is low, in the ensuing
game there is no dominant strategy for CP 2: if CP 1 achieves exclusivity, then CP 2 will not, while
if CP 1 does not, then CP 2 will. In this region, therefore, CP 1 has to take into account also the
additional possibility that, by not accepting exclusivity, it will induce CP 2 to achieve exclusivity at
some ISP i, which actually can benet CP 1 since it will achieve higher revenues at ISP  i: this opens
the room for a (NE, E) equilibrium when a is su¢ ciently high.
No fragmentation. For relatively high values of the advertising rate r and a <ba, no fragmentation
occurs. All content is available to both platforms and, thus, to all end users. In this area, it is a
dominant strategy for CP 2 to never accept exclusivity at the second stage. Anticipating this, CP 1
also has no incentive to get exclusivity in the rst stage since the advertising rate r is high enough.
CPs prefer to obtain revenues via advertising at both platforms than via exclusivity fees.
From (4), we also obtain that the number of the end users subscribed to the ISP with more
content (i.e., with u12) or with the more valuable content (u1), is higher than the number of end users
subscribed to the ISP with less content (either u1 or u2) or the less valuable content (u2). In addition,
from (3), we obtain that the ISP with more content or the more valuable content can extract higher
subscription fees by the end users. Nevertheless, in all cases, the prots of ISP A are equal to the
prots of ISP B: While this is trivial without fragmentation, as both ISPs carry the same content,
10We provide all the details of this equilibrium scenario in Appendix A.
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identical prots arise also with full or partial fragmentation due to the bargaining power that CPs
have to pay low exclusivity fees or even extract a part of the ISPsprots. The bidding war among
the ISPs for an exclusive CP makes them - nally - indi¤erent between winning and losing.
Comparative statics We now discuss how Internet fragmentation is a¤ected through changes in
the exogenous parameters of our setting. In particular, we study u12, which is a measure of content
substitutability, and t, which is a measure of ISPsintensity of competition.
Complementarity of content. First, we examine how the level of complementarity (or substi-
tutability) of the two contents a¤ects the equilibrium outcome. We obtain these results by directly
di¤erentiating expressions (7) and (8) with respect to u12. As the level of complementarity between the
two contents u12 increases, the two thresholds br(a) and er increase as well ( dbr=du12 > 0, der=du12 > 0).
This means that the threshold br(a) that characterizes the full fragmentation area increases with u12,
leading to more full fragmentation, and that the threshold er that characterizes the no fragmentation
area increases with u12 as well, leading to less no fragmentation in the market.
Proposition 2 As the two contents become more complementary, that is, as u12 increases, full frag-
mentation is more likely to arise in equilibrium, while no fragmentation is less likely to arise in
equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: full fragmentation is more likely when the content
becomes more complementary because it is then particularly valuable for an ISP to try to break an
equilibrium without full fragmentation. To see this, imagine that ISP i has an exclusive deal with CP
1 at stage 1. At stage 2, ISP  i can either o¤er an exclusivity deal to CP 2, or let this content be
available on both platforms: since u12 is large, the latter scenario is what ISP  i wants to avoid, since
it would be only the rival to benet from the complementarity. This shifts to the left the thresholdbr(a) that we identied at stage 2, making full fragmentation more likely to arise. As an outcome, no
consumer enjoys any complementarity, precisely when this could be valuable to them. This apparent
paradox arises because, taking as given the exclusivity reached by the rival ISP, the remaining ISP
does not want to confer a positive externality to its rival.
As CPs are instead more substitutable for the end users, it becomes less and less likely that a full
fragmentation scenario could emerge in equilibrium. In the limiting case, if the content of CP 2 does
not add any more value when consumed jointly (u12 = u1) and the termination fee f is zero, there is
no possibility of full fragmentation.11
11From (6), we have ba!1 when u12 ! u1 and from (7), we have br ! 0 when u12 ! u1 and f ! 0.
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Moreover, an increase in u12 shifts er up, which means that the no fragmentation area reduces as
content becomes more complementary. To see this, imagine CP 2 delivers its content to both ISPs.
As u12 goes up, it becomes more likely that CP 1 prefers to be available exclusively at one ISP, which
will be willing to pay a slotting allowance to CP 1, so as to take advantage solely of the content
complementarity. This leads to a decrease in the area of no fragmentation.
The above result is presented in a numerical example in Figure 3. Three alternative cases are
plotted. First, the CPs o¤er complementary contents (u12 > u1 + u2). Second, the CPs o¤er purely
additive content (u12 = u1 + u2) and, third, they o¤er substitutable contents (u12 < u1 + u2).
[Place Figure 3 about here]
Competition between ISPs. As t increases, the ISPs become more di¤erentiated such that competi-
tion between them is reduced. By directly di¤erentiating expressions (8) and (7) with respect to t, we
obtain that the threshold er always decreases with t ( der=dt < 0), whereas the threshold br(a) increases
for low a (dbr=dt  0 for a  6f(u12 u2)+(u12 u1)(u1 u2+3(u12 u2))2(u12 u1)(3f+u12 u1) ) and decreases with high a.
Proposition 3 As competition between ISPs increases, Internet fragmentation is more likely to arise
in equilibrium. Full fragmentation may be either more or less likely to arise, depending on the level of
ad competition between CPs.
The threshold er shifts down with t, which means that no fragmentation is more likely to arise
in equilibrium. Competition among the ISPs is relaxed and, thus, they are less keen on obtaining
exclusivity of content to boost their own demand, since the end users are less willing to switch to the
rival ISP. Concerning the threshold br(a) that denes the full fragmentation area, we nd that br(a)
shifts to the right with t when a is relatively high leading to less full fragmentation, but br(a) shifts up
for relatively low values of a. In Figure 4, we present a numerical example.
[Place Figure 4 about here]
5 NN regulation: Zero-price rule, strict zero-price rule and the no-
exclusivity rule
We now discuss the impact of the di¤erent approaches to NN regulation on Internet fragmentation.
First, NN regulation can impose a zero-price rule, which sets the termination fee to zero. Second, a
stricter form of the zero-price rule restricts all fees that might be exchanged between ISPs and CPs
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to zero (i.e., the termination and the exclusivity fees). Third, and alternatively, NN regulation could
impose a straightforward no-exclusivity rule which forbids any exclusivity arrangements between ISPs
and CPs, but does not impose restrictions on the termination fees (this would preclude the rst two
stages of the basic game described in the previous section). We now analyze each case in turn.
5.1 Zero-price rule
The e¤ect of a zero-price rule can be readily addressed by studying how a change in f a¤ects the
equilibrium outcome of the (otherwise) unregulated scenario. In particular, di¤erentiating the rele-
vant thresholds (7) and (8) with respect to f , yields @br=@f > 0 and @er=@f > 0. Consequently, as
the termination fee f increases, full fragmentation is more likely to arise in equilibrium, while no
fragmentation is less likely to arise in equilibrium. However, it is important to note that (full and
partial) Internet fragmentation may still occur under a zero-price rule where f is restricted to zero.
The equilibrium properties described by Proposition 1 remain valid.
Proposition 4 A zero-price rule cannot prevent full or partial Internet fragmentation. However,
Internet fragmentation is less likely to occur under a zero-price rule.
[Place Figure 5 about here]
In Figure 5, we change the values of the termination fee f , and nd that, as f increases, the area
of full fragmentation increases and the area of no fragmentation decreases, since it becomes more
expensive for the CPs to deliver their contents to both ISPs.12
5.2 Strict zero-price rule
Under the strict notion of the zero-price rule, both termination fees and exclusivity fees are restricted
to zero, i.e., f = eij = 0; i = A;B; j = 1; 2. Otherwise, the structure and timing of the game remains
the same as before. In particular, a CP can still choose to o¤er its content (without any direct nancial
compensation) exclusively at one of the two ISPs.
Again, we provide some intuition for the derivation of the equilibrium, while we relegate all the
technical details to Appendix B. The lump-sum fees have no impact on the optimal subscription price
of the ISPs in the third stage of the game. In the second stage, CP 2 decides whether to accept
exclusivity or not, provided CP 1s decision. If CP 1 has an exclusivity contract with an ISP, then
12All prots must be non-negative. A su¢ cient condition is r  2f , which is always satised in Figure 5.
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CP 2 wishes to be exclusive with the other ISP if and only if ad competition between the two CPs
is strong (a > ba). Otherwise, if CP 1 does not have an exclusivity contract with any ISP, then CP 2
always prefers not be exclusive to any ISP. Anticipating this, CP 1 decides whether to be exclusive
to any ISP in the rst stage. In the absence of exclusivity fees, the ISPs cannot engage in a bidding
war for CP 1. Nevertheless, we nd that if ad competition between the CPs is strong (a > ba), CP 1
opts for exclusivity exactly to mitigate this e¤ect, anticipating that CP 2 will also opt for exclusivity.
Otherwise, if competition is weak, CP 1 decides to deliver its content to all ISPs and thus, CP 2 also
refrains from exclusivity which yields no fragmentation in equilibrium. Thus, partial fragmentation
cannot occur in equilibrium under the strict zero-price rule.
Proposition 5 Full Internet fragmentation may arise in equilibrium even under the strict zero-price
rule, where all termination and exclusivity fees are zero. In particular, full Internet fragmentation
emerges in equilibrium when competition between CPs is intense (a > ba). Otherwise, the Internet
remains unfragmented. Partial fragmentation does not emerge in equilibrium.
In addition, by comparing the two full fragmentation cases (one arises when ISP A delivers exclu-
sively the content of CP 1 and ISP B delivers exclusively the content of CP 2, the other is when ISP
A delivers exclusively the content of CP 2 and ISP B delivers exclusively the content of CP 1), we
observe that ISP i obtains higher prots than its rival ISP, when ISP i carries the content of the more
e¢ cient CP. In contrast, without NN regulation or under the standard zero-price rule, the two ISPs
always obtained the same prots for the same parameter values due to the power of CPs to extract a
part of the ISPsprots. In the absence of exclusivity fees, the bidding war between the ISPs cannot
be triggered, which preserves the ISPsprots.
5.3 No-exclusivity rule
The regulator could also enact a blunt no-exclusivity rule. That is, all content must be delivered to
all ISPs. This rule is similar to a mandated interconnection of networks, which is well-known to the
telecommunications industry. Obviously, under the no-exclusivity rule Internet fragmentation can, by
denition, not occur. This means that the prots of the two ISPs are the same, since they split the
market equally. Likewise, the advertisement revenues of the two CPs are the same, although CP 1 is
more e¢ cient, since they reach an identical exposure.
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6 Welfare analysis and policy implications
6.1 Welfare analysis
To discuss the policy implications for the case without NN regulation and the various NN cases, we
make reference to the concepts of consumer surplus and total welfare. These are natural choices, given
the attention put by regulators on users and e¢ ciency, respectively, though of course one could also
conduct an additional analysis based on the prots of the remaining stakeholders.
We start with consumer surplus. By summing up the net surplus of all end users, we obtain the
consumerssurplus for all potential values of uA and uB,
CS =
Z DA
0
(uA   pA   tz) dz +
Z 1
DA
(uB   pB   t (1  z)) dz:
By substituting the demand and subscription fees (from expressions (4) and (3)), we have
CS =
uA + uB
2
+
(uA   uB)2
36t
  5
4
t. (9)
The analysis of CS is immediate. Note that @CS@ui =
1
2+
ui u i
18t > 0, where the positive sign is always
ensured by (5). Hence, it is always better for consumers at ISP i to obtain more content, whatever the
content o¤ered at ISP  i. Intuitively, higher content will be reected in a higher price, as described
by (3), but competition ensures that the direct increase in utility always more than compensates for
the higher subscription fee. Hence the ranking of possible equilibria, from the consumersperspective,
is unambiguous: no fragmentation is strictly better than any partial fragmentation equilibria, which,
in turn, do strictly better than full fragmentation.
In particular, by substituting the relevant expressions from the equilibrium outcome presented in
Appendix A into expression (9), we nd that, in the unregulated case, it is
CS =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
u1+u2
2 +
(u1 u2)2
36t   54 t if Full fragmentation
u12+u2
2 +
(u12 u2)2
36t   54 t if Partial fragmentation (E;NE)
u12+u1
2 +
(u12 u1)2
36t   54 t if Partial fragmentation (NE;E)
u12   54 t if No fragmentation.
By direct comparison of consumer surplus in the case without NN regulation among the di¤erent
fragmentation scenarios, we conrm the CS ranking described above. Also, CS under the partial
fragmentation (NE;E) scenario is higher compared to the partial fragmentation (E;NE) scenario,
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which is expected since under (NE;E) the more valuable content is delivered to both ISPs and hence
enjoyed by all end users.
We now turn to the analysis of total welfare. Total welfareW is dened as the sum of ISPsprots,
CPsprots and consumerssurplus,
W = ISPA +ISPB +CP1 +CP2 + CS. (10)
The analysis is more involved, as there are now several trade-o¤s. On the one hand, symmetric
distribution of content between both ISPs is more e¢ cient than asymmetric distributions, since the
resulting symmetric ISPsmarket shares at equilibrium minimize transportation costs. In addition,
it is more e¢ cient that users see both types of content, instead of excluding any possible viewer.
Hence, from this perspective, one would expect no fragmentation to dominate both partial and full
fragmentation. On the other hand, however, fragmented equilibria always increase the advertising
revenues that enter directly the prots of the CP that faces no competition, and may increase the
total ad revenues available at a given ISP. Hence, this e¤ect can potentially go in the opposite direction.
To resolve this possible tension, we substitute the relevant expressions from the equilibrium out-
come presented in Appendix A into (10). Total welfare in the unregulated case is then
W =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
u1+u2
2 +
5(u1 u2)2
36t   14 t+ ar if Full fragmentation
u12+u2
2 +
5(u12 u2)2
36t   14 t+ r(3t+u12 u23t + a(3t (u12 u2))6t ) if Partial fragmentation (E;NE)
u12+u1
2 +
5(u12 u1)2
36t   14 t+ r(3t+u12 u13t + a(3t (u12 u1))6t ) if Partial fragmentation (NE;E)
u12   14 t+ 2r if No fragmentation.
(11)
We nd that, whenever a is relatively low (i.e., competition for ad revenues among the CPs
is relatively low and, thus, the advertising prots obtained via exclusivity are not too high), total
welfare under no fragmentation exceeds the total welfare under partial fragmentation, and the latter
exceeds, in turn, the total welfare under full fragmentation.13 In particular, when a  2 this result
always holds. Hence, in this case, all the welfare e¤ects described above go in the same direction and
there is no trade-o¤. Therefore, for weak ad competition among the CPs (low a), it would be socially
more desirable to obtain no fragmentation, since advertising revenues are not important, while content
variety is. Nevertheless, this may not be an equilibrium outcome without any policy intervention.
In addition, when we compare the relative welfare between the two types of partial fragmentation,
13See Appendix C for a welfare comparison of all feasible outcome scenarios.
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we observe a further trade-o¤. When exclusivity is achieved by the more valuable CP, (E;NE), on
the one hand, CS is lower compared to the (NE;E) scenario since less end users enjoy the more
valuable content, but, on the other hand, the more valuable CP obtains a higher market share and
higher prots.
Proposition 6 No fragmentation is always the e¢ cient outcome with respect to consumer surplus.
With respect to total welfare, no fragmentation is e¢ cient when ad competition between content
providers is rather low (a  2). When ad competition between content providers is rather high (a > 2),
any one of the feasible fragmentation outcomes ((NE, NE), (E, NE), (NE,E), (E,E)) may be e¢ cient
with respect to total welfare, depending crucially on the interplay of the parameter values.
Using the same numerical example as before, the total welfare ranking is illustrated in Figure
6, which shows the region of validity of each equilibrium outcome (focus on the solid lines), and
the corresponding welfare ranking (focus on the downward sloping dashed and dotted lines). Below
the downward sloping dashed line, the e¢ cient outcome is no fragmentation (NE;NE). Above the
downward sloping dotted line, the e¢ cient outcome is full fragmentation (E;E), while in between
the dashed and the dotted line, the e¢ cient outcome is partial fragmentation (NE;E).14 It is clear
that, for the same set of parameters, the corresponding equilibrium outcome does not always coincide
with the e¢ cient outcome. In fact, only in the shaded areas the privately chosen equilibrium regimes
are also socially optimal. In all other areas, a welfare-maximizing regulator would want to achieve
a di¤erent regime. Note the richness of possibilities that arise: there may be both excessive content
(e.g., point A), as well as excessive exclusivity (e.g., point B). At point A, the equilibrium outcome
is no fragmentation (NE;NE), while the social optimum regime is full fragmentation (E;E). But at
point B, rms choose full fragmentation (E;E), while the social optimum regime is no fragmentation
(NE;NE). Note that for a < 2 only excessive exclusivity may arise.
[Place Figure 6 about here]
6.2 Policy implications
Having shown that there is potentially room for intervention, the next step is to ask whether the
specic policy tools at the regulators disposal are apt to improve welfare.15 We rst discuss the
14Note that this precise welfare ranking is due to the choice of parameters. For a di¤erent set of parameters, partial
fragmentation with (E, NE) may emerge as the e¢ cient outcome in between no and full fragmentation, or partial
fragmentation may never be e¢ cient.
15 In this analysis, a social planner (or a regulator) can impose a specic type of Internet fragmentation via the NN
tools he may use, but he does not set the subscription fees paid by the end users.
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role played by termination fees in an otherwise unregulated scenario (zero-price rule). Note that the
presence of the termination fees does not a¤ect the level of total welfare since these fees are pure
transfers from the CPs to the ISPs. Nevertheless, the termination fees a¤ect the critical thresholds of
r which dene the type of Internet fragmentation. When the termination fee f increases, both critical
thresholds br(a) and er increase, thus, full fragmentation becomes more likely, while no fragmentation
becomes less likely (Proposition 4). Through exclusivity, the CPs avoid paying the termination fees
twice. Therefore, the zero-price rule where the termination fee is restricted to zero, ensures that no
fragmentation emerges more often in equilibrium. However, as pointed out by Proposition 4 and Figure
5, partial and full fragmentation remain to emerge in equilibrium. In addition, a strict zero-price rule,
where both termination and exclusivity fees are restricted to zero, ensures that no fragmentation
emerges more often in equilibrium, compared to the unregulated case; but it does not always ensure
no fragmentation. Consequently, a (strict) zero-price rule is not a perfect policy instrument to fully
prevent Internet fragmentation. Clearly, when consumer surplus is the ultimate policy goal, then no
fragmentation is always the preferred outcome, and a no-exclusivity rule is consequently a perfect
policy instrument.
Proposition 7 With respect to consumer surplus, the no-exclusivity rule is a perfect policy instru-
ment.
With respect to total welfare, the analysis is more involved. According to Proposition 6, no Internet
fragmentation is the unique e¢ cient outcome when the intensity of competition over ads among the
CPs is rather low (i.e., a  2). Thus, for the subsequent discussion it is useful to consider this case
rst, and then the case where a > 2.
When no Internet fragmentation is the unique e¢ cient outcome (a < 2) As mentioned
above the zero-price rule can help to achieve the e¢ cient outcome in equilibrium more often (see
Figure 7). However, even when a  2, partial and full fragmentation continue to arise in equilibrium
for low values of r.
[Place Figure 7 about here]
By contrast, recall that the strict zero-price rule prevents partial fragmentation in equilibrium and
achieves no fragmentation whenever a  ba (see Proposition 5). Since ba > 2, the strict zero-price rule
e¤ectively prevents Internet fragmentation for a  2 (see Figure 8). However, the strict zero-price rule
is a heavy-handed regulation that is hard to administer, because the regulator would have to monitor
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the possible side-payments (eij) between CPs and ISPs. Evidently, for a  2 the same outcome of
no fragmentation could also be achieved by the simple no-exclusivity rule, which is much easier to
administer and should therefore be the preferred regulatory instrument in this parameter range.
[Place Figure 8 about here]
Proposition 8 When no Internet fragmentation is the unique e¢ cient outcome (i.e., when a2),
all policy interventions (zero-price rule, strict zero-price rule and no-exclusivity rule) will improve
total welfare. In particular, the strict zero-price rule and the no-exclusivity rule are perfect policy
instruments in this case.
When Internet fragmentation may be the e¢ cient outcome (a > 2) When the regulator
deems that a > 2, or if it is unsure about the level of a, and it puts considerable weight on total welfare
(as opposed to consumer surplus alone), then the choice of the appropriate policy instruments is much
more complicated. In fact, none of the policy instruments surveyed here will be able to perfectly align
private and social incentives for all parameter ranges.
Consider the case when ad competition between CPs is intense (a > ba), such that full fragmentation
is most likely the e¢ cient outcome, unless r is close to zero. In this parameter range full fragmentation
is already achieved in equilibrium without any policy intervention. Thus, the use of additional policy
instruments cannot do better than if the market were left without NN regulation. At least the zero-
price rule and the strict-zero-price rule will not a¤ect this privately e¢ cient equilibrium outcome and
they are thus not harmful here (see also Figures 7 and 8). On the contrary, the application of the
no-exclusivity rule could yield to excessive content in this parameter range and is thus potentially
harmful to total welfare.
For the case where ad competition between CPs is at an intermediate level (a 2 (2;ba)), a meaningful
application of any one of the available policy instruments seems almost impossible. Depending on the
parameter range and on the policy instrument, welfare can be improved or deteriorated (see Figures
7 and 8) in comparison to the case without NN regulation. Consider point D in Figure 7 and 8, for
example. Here the e¢ cient outcome is full fragmentation, which is achieved in the private equilibrium
for f = 0:4. Any type of intervention ((strict) zero-price rule or no-exclusivity rule) would be counter-
productive there, as this would alter the full fragmentation result and would in turn decrease welfare
(the strict zero-price rule and the no-exclusivity rule would lead to no fragmentation, while the zero-
price rule would lead to partial fragmentation). In other cases instead, when r is low, the strict zero-
price rule and also the no-exclusivity rule are able to do much better than the private equilibrium,
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because they can achieve the rst-best regime (e.g., point B in Figure 6).
Proposition 9 When ad competition between content providers is intense (a > ba), policy interven-
tions are at best superuous with respect to total welfare, but can also be harmful as in the case of the
no-exclusivity rule. For intermediate levels of content providersad competition (2 < a < ba), any one
of the available policy instruments can be harmful to total welfare.
In conclusion, it seems that, for a > 2, any policy intervention is either unnecessary or risks to be
harmful to total welfare. Thus, in the absence of a clear benet from regulation, it seems safe to say
that policy intervention should be avoided.
7 Model extensions and limitations
The base model presented above already provides a rich set of equilibria and nuanced policy advice.
In an e¤ort to demonstrate the robustness as well as the potential limitations of the base model and
its implications, we will now scrutinize some of the assumptions made.
First, the base model assumes that ISPs negotiate initially with the more valuable CP and then
subsequently with the less valuable CP. In Appendix D we explore an alternative timing of the game,
where both ISPs o¤er exclusivity contracts simultaneously to the CPs. The analysis shows that our
results are very robust in this regard. More precisely, the only di¤erence to the results of the base
model is this that, for large r and large a, no fragmentation and full fragmentation are equilibria.
However, this does not a¤ect our policy conclusions since full fragmentation remains an equilibrium
for large a and is the unique equilibrium for small r and large a.
Second, we posited that the measure of complementarity of the two contents (u12) and the measure
of ad competition among the CPs (a) are independent. However, it could reasonably be argued that
strong CP competition over ads is likely to be driven by high substitutability of content. Thus u12
and a might be negatively correlated. In Appendix E, we analyze the fragmentation equilibria under
such correlation and show that our results are robust to this modication.
Third, in the base model we assume that the CPs investment in quality is sunk already at the
time when CPs decide about accepting exclusivity contracts. We then characterize the equilibrium
for every feasible constellation of CPscontent qualities. In Appendix F we allow instead the CPs to
strategically invest in quality prior to negotiating exclusivity. We then determine for zero and non-zero
termination fees which quality levels will be chosen by the CPs, and which fragmentation outcome
will prevail in equilibrium. We can show that termination fees do not just a¤ect the fragmentation
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regime, but also the CPsincentives to invest in content quality. As in the base model, fragmentation
becomes more likely when termination fees increase. However, under fragmentation, CPsincentives
to invest into quality also increase. Thus, over and beyond the welfare e¤ects discussed previously, a
departure from the zero-price rule has an additional positive welfare e¤ect due to the fact that CPs
content quality is likely to increase.
Fourth, the base model assumes that termination fees are exogenous and the same for both ISPs.
We then characterize the equilibrium for every value of such a termination fee. Although this assump-
tion is certainly a simplication, which keeps the analysis tractable, it is worth mentioning that it
is not an insensible assumption. Firstly, as termination fees are currently set at zero, it is unlikely
that a regulator would allow for large variations compared to the status quo, as changes might be
disruptive. Secondly, if changes are allowed, they would be implemented either by the regulator itself,
who would treat ISPs identically, or by industry-wide agreements that, again, are very likely to be
non-discriminatory. In either case, both ISPs would charge the same level of f . Yet, it is of interest
to analyze the case where, alternatively, each ISP could set unilaterally its own termination fee, that
is, ISP A could set a termination fee fA unilaterally and independently from fB, the fee set by ISP
B: We study this extension in Appendix G. We nd that each ISP would have unilateral incentives
to set high termination fees, as it is typical of competitive bottlenecks. We can show that the results
of Proposition 4 are extended to its natural consequence: with endogenous termination fees, the only
equilibria that can arise are those that involve full fragmentation. Moreover, as termination fees, in
our model, do not a¤ect the amount of content delivered, they are simply an additional rent extraction
device that ISPs use to appropriate CPsprots, but they do not directly a¤ect total surplus.
Fifth, in the base model we assume that end users subscribe to exactly one of the two ISPs, i.e.,
they single-home. This is sensible when end users have a limited budget or when they incur signicant
transaction costs for establishing and maintaining a second network subscription. However, it can also
be reasonable to assume that end users are indeed able to subscribe to both ISPs, i.e., they multi-home.
This can be desirable when users are confronted with a full fragmentation scenario. By multi-homing
users can then undofragmentation. We study multi-homing in Appendix H. We derive that multi-
homing can possibly occur, and thus a¤ect our results, only in a fairly limited parameter region. This
is the case when t 2

u12 u2
2 ;
2u12 (u1+u2)
2

, i.e., when the degree of content complementarity (u12) is
neither too large, nor too small compared to the degree of di¤erentiation between ISPs (t). Even in
this parameter region, we can show that the di¤erent fragmentation scenarios that we characterize
under single-homing (full/partial/no fragmentation) still arise. In this sense, our main results are
robust. However, in line with the intuition, if we allow for multi-homing, fragmentation becomes less
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likely as users themselves can undo full fragmentation by subscribing to both ISPs. Moreover, multi-
homing yields new trade-o¤s with respect to welfare. On the one hand, with multi-homing some (but
generally not all) end users see all content under full fragmentation. This tends to increase consumer
surplus compared to single-homing. On the other hand, prices are monopoly-like under multi-homing
and those end users that multi-home also bear additional transportion costs. This tends to lower
consumer surplus compared to single-homing. Likewise, there exists also an additional welfare trade-
o¤ from the perspective of the CPs. On the one hand, CPs earn less exclusivity ad revenues under
multi-homing. On the other hand, there is also additional demand (viewers) due to multi-homing. In
other words, we cannot expect that multi-homing generally delivers better welfare results compared
to single-homing and the assessment depends crucially on the specic parameter setting.
Sixth, in the base model we assume that CPs receive revenues predominantly from advertising. In
fact, this was highlighted as one of the distinct features that di¤erentiates Internet CPs from other,
traditional CPs. Notice that even though a CPs revenue model may not be entirely nanced through
advertisement, it may still heavily rely on advertisement. This includes the so-called freemium
model, where a basic version of the content is o¤ered for free (and nanced through advertisements)
whereas consumers have to pay extra to access to the premium version. Popular services that use the
freemium model are, for example, Skype, LinkedIn, Spotify and Flickr. However, even for the most
successful services, the freemium model still relies on advertising. Usually users that are willing to
pay for the service are greatly outnumbered and comprise only around ve percent of all users (see,
e.g., Doerr et al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2013). Accordingly, advertisement expenditures on the Internet
continue to grow (Nielsen, 2013). Nevertheless, we acknowledge as a limitation of our model that we
do not consider direct payments between end users and CPs. This would fundamentally change our
model and parallel more closely the model analyzed in Hagiu and Lee (2011).
Seventh, in the base model we assume that ISPs make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the CPs. This
does not necessarily mean that all the surplus of CPs is extracted. The ISPsbargaining power is
in fact limited as they compete for attaining exclusivity with CPs. In any case, it is important to
highlight that the relative bargaining power of ISPs and CPs in each stage will only a¤ect the size and
sign of the exclusivity fee, but not the fragmentation equilibrium outcome or corresponding welfare
result. This is because the fragmentation equilibrium depends on the joint prots of ISP and CP, and
is independent of how the joint prots are divided between the two.
Finally, our welfare analysis rests on the assumption that advertising is informative. If it were
purely persuasive, we should have instead given zero weight to advertising since it has no realvalue
to consumers (Bagwell, 2007, p. 1705), in which case we currently overestimate the benets from
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advertising for welfare. Moreover, a fuller model of informative advertising would need to take into
account also the prots of the producers who advertise, and of the consumers/subscribers who also
consume the advertised products. We have basically given a zero weight to these additional aspects, so
we may be either under- or over-estimating the role of advertising rates in our social welfare function.
8 Summary and conclusion
The potential fragmentation of the Internet due to exclusivity agreements between CPs and ISPs is
currently of concern to policy makers, such as the European Commission. This is because Internet
fragmentation counters the idea of a global Internet in which content is ubiquitously available and
benets everybody. In this context, it has been argued that the principle of NN would preserve an
unfragmented Internet (Lee and Wu, 2009). More specically, it is argued that absent NN regulation,
which imposes a zero-price rule on the termination fees that CPs must pay to ISPs, the emergence of
Internet fragmentation is enkindled by the ISPsdesire to compete on exclusive content.
In this article, we formally investigate this argument under some general assumptions. In par-
ticular, we study how termination fees (i.e., a zero-price rule), competition between ISPs, and ad
competition between CPs a¤ect the emergence of exclusive contracts and thus Internet fragmenta-
tion. We nd that the zero-price rule of NN is neither a su¢ cient nor a necessary policy instrument
to prevent Internet fragmentation. More precisely, we can show that Internet fragmentation (partial
or full) emerges in equilibrium, both without NN regulation as well as under a zero-price rule. Full
Internet fragmentation even continues to emerge in equilibrium under a strict notion of the zero-price
rule where not only the termination fees, but all side payments (exclusivity fees) between CPs and
ISPs are restricted to zero. Thus, if the ultimate regulatory goal is to prevent Internet fragmentation,
then it seems more appropriate to directly target the emergence of exclusive content by means of a
no-exclusivity rule. In contrast to a zero-price rule, for which the regulator would need to monitor
the payments between CPs and ISPs, a no-exclusivity rule is relatively easy to administer and con-
trol. However, we can also conrm that the zero-price rule indeed increases the likelihood that the
Internet remains unfragmented in equilibrium, while at the same time full fragmentation becomes
less likely. Hence, all of the considered policy interventions (zero-price rule, strict zero-price rule and
no-exclusivity rule) will push the market towards less or even no Internet fragmentation in comparison
to a market without NN regulation.
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether any policy intervention is justied in the present context.
We proved that no fragmentation is in fact always the e¢ cient outcome with respect to consumer
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surplus. Consequently, if the policy maker considers consumer surplus as its welfare standard, then
the use of a no-exclusivity rule is advisable. However, with respect to total welfare no fragmentation is
only the e¢ cient outcome whenever the competition over ads among the CPs is not too strong. On the
contrary, if ad competition between CPs is intense (which implies that the advertisement revenues that
CPs can earn under full exclusivity are much higher than under competition) then full fragmentation
becomes the e¢ cient outcome with respect to total surplus, provided that advertising is informative.
In the latter case, none of the above policy tools is able to improve upon the equilibrium outcome
absent regulation. Evidently, here intervention by means of a no-exclusivity rule entails a signicant
type I error as it may even be detrimental to total welfare in this case. Also for intermediate levels of
ad competition between CPs, all of the surveyed policy instruments are subject to signicant type I
(i.e., regulating away from the rst-best) or type II (i.e., not regulating towards the rst-best) errors.
Although welfare improvements may be achieved under some circumstances, it may also occur that
welfare is deteriorated. Thus, any policy intervention is very risky and should be avoided.
In conclusion, we do not nd a strong case for the use of NN regulation to prevent Internet
fragmentation. Although NN regulation may lessen the extent of Internet fragmentation, it cannot
prevent it. If this is desired, a simple no-exclusivity rule seems to be more suitable to achieve this.
Moreover with respect to total welfare, Internet fragmentation is not necessarily an ine¢ cient outcome
and any policy intervention involves signicant errors and may thus be harmful. In order to avoid ill
guided regulation, especially in such a dynamic industry, where not only consumer surplus but also
innovations (for which total welfare is a sensible measure) are important, it is therefore reasonable not
to impose NN regulation ex ante. Of course, this does not limit the applicability of ex-post regulation
in the form of competition policy, which may still scrutinize termination fees and exclusivity contracts,
but on a case-by-case basis.
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Figure 1: Potential subgames
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Figure 2: Equilibrium outcome for t = 1; u12 = 3; u1= 2; u2= 1; f = 0
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Figure 3: t = 1; u1= 2; u2= 1; f = 0
dashed line: u12= 3:5, thin line: u12= 3, thick line: u12= 2:5
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Figure 4: u12= 3; u1= 2; u2= 1; f = 0
dashed line: t = 1, thin line: t = 2, thick line: t = 3
38
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
a
f = 0
f = 0.2
f = 0.4
r
Figure 5: t = 1; u12= 3; u1= 2; u2= 1
dashed line: f = 0:4, thin line: f = 0:2, thick line: f = 0
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Figure 6: Equilibrium outcome without NN regulation and
socially optimal areas for t = 1; u12= 3; u1= 2; u2= 1; f = 0
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Figure 7: Performance of the zero-price rule in comparison to no NN regulation:
Black shaded areas indicate welfare improvements towards the rst-best, whereas gray
shaded areas indicate welfare deteriorations away from the rst-best
(t = 1; u12= 3; u1= 2; u2= 1)
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Figure 8: Performance of the strict zero-price rule in comparison to no NN regulation:
Black shaded areas indicate welfare improvements towards the rst-best, whereas gray
shaded areas indicate welfare deteriorations away from the rst-best
(t = 1; u12= 3; u1= 2; u2= 1; f = 0:4)
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